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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4134 
 ___________ 
 
AMIT KUMAR, 
       Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
    Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A076-641-081) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Daniel Meisner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2012 
 Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., AND COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 16, 2012)                                                                                        
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Amit Kumar petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen.  We will deny the petition. 
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I. 
  Kumar is a citizen of India who entered the United States illegally in 1999 
and who concedes removability on that basis.  He applied for asylum and other 
relief claiming that the brothers of his Sikh girlfriend beat him on account of his 
Hindu beliefs.  An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) rejected his claims and ordered his 
removal to India, and the BIA affirmed in 2002.  Kumar did not petition for 
review. 
 In 2011, Kumar filed with the BIA the motion to reopen at issue here.  He 
conceded that it was untimely because he filed it more than ninety days after his 
final order of removal, but he argued that it qualifies for the exception for motions 
based on changed country conditions.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Kumar now claims that he is homosexual, that he had his first 
such relations after entering the United States, and that he contracted HIV in 2008.  
He also argues that he faces mistreatment on account of both his homosexuality 
and his HIV-positive status in India and that he may be unable to obtain necessary 
HIV medication if returned there.  Kumar supported his motion with evidence of 
his medical condition and various articles regarding the treatment of homosexuals 
and those with HIV in India.1
                                                 
1 The Government argues that Kumar could have raised a claim based on 
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 The BIA denied the motion as untimely and not based on materially changed 
country conditions.  The BIA concluded that Kumar’s newly professed 
homosexuality and his contraction of HIV are changes in personal circumstances 
that do not show changed country conditions.  The BIA further concluded that 
homosexuality has long been illegal and stigmatized in India and that Kumar has 
not shown that conditions for homosexuals or those with HIV have materially 
changed since his hearing in 2000.  Finally, the BIA also declined to reopen 
Kumar’s proceeding sua sponte.  Kumar petitions for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we review the denial 
of reopening for abuse of discretion.  See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 
(3d Cir. 2011).2
                                                                                                                                                             
homosexuality before the IJ because his new evidence reports that he has been 
“sexually attracted to men from an early age” (A.R. 31), was in a homosexual 
relationship at the time of his hearing before the IJ (id. 32), and indeed came to the 
United States “to escape persecution as a homosexual man in India” (id. 35).  The 
BIA did not reach this issue, however, so we will not consider it. 
  We will not disturb the BIA’s ruling unless it is “‘arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.’”  Id. at 158 (citation omitted).  We review the BIA’s 
underlying assessment of the record for substantial evidence and may not disturb it 
 
2 We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary denial of 
reopening sua sponte, see id. at 159-60, but Kumar has not challenged that aspect 
of its ruling. 
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unless “‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.’”  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
 Kumar raises essentially four arguments on review, but each lacks merit.  
First, Kumar concedes that homosexuality has long been illegal and stigmatized in 
India, but he argues that the BIA overlooked a new policy of compulsory testing 
for HIV that makes an individual’s HIV-positive status (and apparently presumed 
homosexuality) more likely to be discovered.  Kumar cites for this proposition only 
the argument contained in his motion to reopen, which in turn does not cite any 
actual evidence of record.  (Petr.’s Br. at 13) (citing A.R. 20).  In any event, the 
underlying evidence does not support it.  One article cites a 2002 study suggesting 
that over 95% of hospital patients listed for surgery were tested for HIV against 
their will, but the article does not state whether or how that represents a change 
since 2000.  (A.R. 43.)  In addition, as the Government notes, that article 
references proposed state bills regarding compulsory testing that have not passed 
and states that the Indian government instead supports voluntary testing.  (Id. 42.)  
Another article does as well.  (Id. 62) (“The government has issued a 
comprehensive HIV testing policy indicating that no individual should undergo 
mandatory testing for HIV[.]”).  In sum, the record does not support Kumar’s 
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argument that the BIA overlooked a changed condition in this regard. 
 Second, Kumar suggests that the BIA wrongly read our decision in Liu to 
hold that a change in personal circumstances can never support a motion to reopen.  
The BIA, however, did not deny Kumar’s motion on the sole basis that it described 
a change in personal circumstances.  To the contrary, it rightly cited Liu for the 
proposition that an alien filing an otherwise untimely motion to reopen on the basis 
of changed personal circumstances “must also demonstrate changed country 
conditions.”  (BIA Dec. at 1) (citing Liu, 555 F.3d at 151).  The BIA then 
concluded that Kumar had not shown changed country conditions here.   
 Third, Kumar argues that the BIA inadequately considered his evidence in 
reaching that conclusion.  We disagree.  The BIA’s discussion was indeed on the 
cursory side, but we cannot say that the record before it required more.  The BIA 
cited Kumar’s exhibits and, although it discussed only one by way of example, 
accurately summarized their contents and explained why they do not show a 
change in country conditions.  Thus, the BIA both “‘demonstrate[d] that it has 
considered [Kumar’s] evidence” and “‘provide[d] us with more than cursory, 
summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern its reasons for 
declining to afford relief[.]’”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 
2008) (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  Kumar does not 
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cite any specific evidence potentially showing changed conditions that the BIA 
overlooked, and our own review of the record confirms that the BIA’s conclusion 
was supported by substantial evidence.3
 Finally, Kumar faults the BIA for failing to address whether he belongs to a 
particular social group or whether he faces “other serious harm” for purposes of 
humanitarian asylum.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).  As the Government 
argues, Kumar did not exhaust these issues by raising them before the BIA.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  There also was no reason for the BIA to discuss any potential 
social group once it concluded that Kumar’s untimely motion was not based on 
changed country conditions.  In addition, Kumar did not apply for humanitarian 
asylum, and there is no indication that the BIA erroneously thought that his 
medical concerns are irrelevant to such relief.  Cf. Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 162-63 
(remanding where BIA’s decision suggested that it may have thought the 
availability of medical care irrelevant). 
 
 In sum, while we sympathize with Kumar’s medical condition and his desire 
to remain in the United States, nothing in the record before us permits us to 
conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.  
                                                 
3 The Government argues that Kumar’s evidence shows, if anything, that medical 
treatment for those with HIV in India has improved in recent years.  (A.R. 38, 41, 
43-45, 52-53, 57.)  The BIA made no conclusion to that effect, but this evidence 
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Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                                                                                                                             
certainly did not compel it to conclude otherwise. 
